Hertfordshire Constabulary/Essex Police
Peer Group Review of Operation Mansell
Anti Fracking protest
Sussex Police
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1.0 Background

Operation Mansell is the Sussex Police operational response to the exploratory drilling by Cuadrilla at Lower Stumble Wood, Balcombe and the consequent environmental protests against the potential use of the ‘Fracking’ technique at the site to release any discovered oil or gas reserves.

Cuadrilla Ltd holds Petroleum Exploration and Development Licences issued in July 2008 by the Department for Energy and Climate Change. The company intimated in early 2013 that they intended conducting exploratory drilling in the summer of 2013, prior to their licence expiry, to assess the viability of extracting oil from the site. Whilst it was reported that the exploratory drilling would not involve hydraulically fracturing the rock (‘fracking’), further exploratory testing might.

Whilst not the primary licensing authority, West Sussex County Council do license certain aspects of the operation, particularly around the impact of the operation on the immediate highway and communities, together with the Environment Agency who monitor waste management and the impact on the immediate environment.

Fracking is a contentious issue, with national and local opposition. It was assessed that, nationally, protest activity and direct action was likely and the nature of the protest community within Sussex made it highly probable that there would be local protest against the activity. Cuadrilla have previously conducted fracking in Lancashire, where environmental protest activity involved direct action such as lock-ons and aggravated trespass; some of the individuals involved in this direct action came from the Brighton area and it was likely that such activity could be repeated in Sussex.

The site at Lower Stumbles Wood is privately owned by the Balcombe Estate and is a pre-existing drill site where a previous bore-hole was drilled by an oil exploration company some years ago. As such it already comprised of an area of hard-standing around the capped drill
head, all accessed via an aggregate roadway off of the B2036 Balcombe Road, south of the village of Balcombe, West Sussex.

In early 2013, Cuadrilla built up a presence at the Lower Stumble Wood site, which involved extending the hard-standing ‘foot print’ and improving the access road, together with building the site infrastructure to support a 24 hour test drilling operation. At this time, the drill rig was not on-site. Throughout this period, local opposition groups had undertaken peaceful and lawful protest activity at the site entrance and through traditional democratic means, such as meetings and lobbying of council and governmental agencies.

The site was subject of a recognised Public Order command and planning structure however, on the 25th July 2013, a significant protest was staged at the Lower Stumble Wood site, which took the Force by surprise. Local people opposed to the drilling, together with some other supporters from Sussex, attended the locations and blockaded the entrance to the site access road, erecting tents and canopies, preventing drilling equipment and supplies from accessing the drill site. At the end of this protest, some of the persons present undertook to stay on at the site, to prevent Cuadrilla from regaining access to the site. This action formed the start of the protests against the test drilling operations, which remain on-going and at their peak have involved 500+ persons in undertaking protests on the B2036 and over 300 persons camping at the site on the road verges.

As a result of the publicity gained by the protests at Balcombe, on 5th August 2013, the environmental protest group, Reclaim the Power and No Dash for Gas, announced that they were switching their annual protest training camp taking place between 16th & 21st August, from Nottingham where they had been planning to raise attention to the West Burton gas Power Station to Balcombe. This event was expected to attract between 500 and 1000 participants and had previously been associated with high impact direct action protest activity. As a result planning started under the operational name Op. Stade, for the policing of the Reclaim the Power camp, whilst also policing protest around the Cuadrilla drilling site.

Drilling concluded at the Balcombe site on the 27th September 2013, with Operation Anchor managing the removal of the drill from the site however subject to West Sussex County Council’s decision regarding licensing, future activity could take pace both on this site and others in Sussex. In preparation for potential future events ACC Smith in Sussex commissioned DCC Adams in Hertfordshire to conduct this peer review, the terms of which are detailed at appendix A.

2.0 The review team’s current roles

The review team was appointed by DCC Adams of Hertfordshire Constabulary and was made up of the following practitioners:

DCC Andy Adams – Andy Adams spent 24 years within Essex police in a number of uniformed and detective roles before moving to Kent in 2009 as ACC Operational
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Support. Within Kent Andy led on a number of significant operational reviews and restructures including command of public order operations. Andy joined Hertfordshire Constabulary in 2012 as DCC. He is an experienced Gold commander across a range of disciplines and holds ACPO responsibility for planned and sporting events as well as mobilisation. Section 40(2)

Superintendent Simon Hawkins – Simon spent 19 years in the Metropolitan Police before moving to Hertfordshire Constabulary in 2005. Simon Hawkins is the specialist operations support Superintendent working within the strategic alliance of Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire. He is experienced accredited Silver and bronze public order commander, football match commander and a Strategic and tactical firearms commander. Simon is also the deputy chair of the ACPO critical incident working group.

Section 40(2)

Chief Inspector John Hayter – Jon has spent his 26 year career within Essex Constabulary and currently manages the Specialist Operations Department – responsible for Public Order Policing, CBRN and Search. Jon is an experienced public order commander operating at Silver and Bronze level. In addition to Public order command, Jon is an experienced operational planner – one example being the planning for Operation Cabinet, the enforcement of planning law at the Dale Farm traveller site. Jon is also a Counter Terrorism Security Coordinator, Post Incident Manager, Tactical Firearms Commander and CBRN Silver Commander.

Section 40(2)

Chief Inspector Nick Caveney – Nick left Lincolnshire in 2005 having worked in detective roles, joining Hertfordshire as a Sergeant. Nick is a Bronze and Silver commander in a range of operational disciplines and an experienced public order Bronze commander. Nick is currently Chief Inspector Joint Protective Services for Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire with responsibility for public order, dogs and armed policing. Section 40(2)

Chief Inspector Ken Townsend – Ken has spent his career within Hertfordshire constabulary primarily in crime investigation roles and currently commands St Albans community safety partnership. He is an accredited and experienced negotiator, has been involved with public order operations as an SIO for some years and brings considerable crime expertise to the team. Section 40(2)

Inspector Adam Willmot – Adam has spent his career within Hertfordshire Constabulary and currently runs the Joint Protective Services Operational Planning & Support Unit for Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire. Adam is an experienced public order trainer, planner and Bronze commander and led on obtaining a College of Policing training licence for public order command in the Eastern region. Adam is also a Counter Terrorism Security Coordinator. Section 40(2)
Inspector Mark Harman – Mark has spent his career within Essex Police and currently runs the Operational Planning Department which is also responsible for mobilisation of resources both from and into the Eastern Region. Mark is an experienced planner having spent six years planning the Essex Police response to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. 

## 3.0 Methodology

### 3.1 The basis of the Review

Fracking is a single issue protest topic which has gathered national and international momentum throughout the preceding years. With prospective license approvals anticipated throughout regions of the UK in 2014 onwards the issue is of national significance to UK Policing. The experiences of Sussex Constabulary are of value not only to Sussex in managing its own operational risk in future years but also to UK policing in totality. Planning work is already on-going in Sussex for future operations. This review seeks to inform that planning process on a local, regional and national level.

### 3.2 Data Collection

Data collection was achieved in two main phases essentially comprising a case study analysis with data triangulation between the two data sources. Initial documentary analysis was conducted with a thematic review of operational plans and strategies at Gold, Silver and Bronze levels encompassing a range of specialisms. Following initial review of the documentary data, specific commanders/themed areas were identified as valuable for face to face interview which took place in December 2013.

### 3.3 Data review

Data was reviewed in three stages. The initial review of documentary data guided the review team in who to speak with during interview and on which areas to focus. The secondary review comprised a hot review and debrief whilst the team were in Sussex in December. The final review, involved each of the review team submitting notes and evidence, particularly surrounding their areas of competence to the report author who has synthesised and triangulated the data to ensure an objective picture has been presented.

## 4. Observations and Findings

The terms of reference for this review specifically requested that observations be made on the following topics:

- Intelligence product – Threat, Policing Style & Stakeholder Relations
- Command Structure
| • Span of command |
| • Clarity of reporting structures & roles |
| • Tactical Plan |
| • Resource Plan |
| • Briefing & De-briefing |

The review team have additionally included consideration of the crime plan, as a topic of worthy comment.

4.1 Intelligence product – Threat, Policing Style & Stakeholder Relations

There is evidence that despite the force being aware of a potential threat at the Cuadrilla site from May 2013 there had not been a sufficiently holistic assessment and more significant preparations had not been progressed. Prior to 25\textsuperscript{th} July 2013 the policing of protest activity was led by the Chief Inspector Operations, West Sussex. Police Liaison Officers were interacting with the protest organisers and there was intelligence, including open source, to suggest the protest would escalate on 25\textsuperscript{th}. It was not apparent how this intelligence was harnessed by the organisation and as such the policing operation did not properly anticipate the escalation which did occur on the 25\textsuperscript{th} July. It is unclear why the available intelligence did not feature in a change of operational deployment.

Once the operation moved into August it was apparent that an appropriate range of intelligence sources were being harnessed, including where appropriate ECHR compliant covert means. As still Section 31(1)(2)

increased protest activity became likely in the run up to 16\textsuperscript{th} August Sussex Constabulary held discussions with Cuadrilla highlighting the security concerns. The contents of the briefing to Cuadrilla were subsequently cited by the company as a primary reason for the suspension of drilling activity over the weekend 17-18\textsuperscript{th} August. It is apparent that Cuadrilla’s decision then became a significant political/economic issue related to subsequent involvement at a more senior political level. Although the presentation of this intelligence directly affected the stakeholder’s position it does however, appear to have been a fully appropriate process to have been followed. Not having informed Cuadrilla of the anticipated risks would have been negligent on the behalf of Sussex police, akin to an R v Osman scenario. What is unclear, however, is the point in time at which formal protocols or memorandum of understandings were drawn up and adhered to between Cuadrilla and Sussex police. It is apparent that identifying and maintaining such a protocol could have provided a clearer framework within which decisions could be made, and ultimately have made the process more transparent and less open to subsequent influence.

It is recommended that a formal MOU between operating company and Police should be sought at the earliest possible stage of future operations.
4.2 Command Structure

In considering the role of Gold in this operation due regard has also been given to the roles and responsibilities of the Police and Crime Commissioner as defined within the Policing Protocol.

It is clear that there was a slow start to the policing of this event and this was coupled with confusion about where the ownership lay; was it simply a local policing issue owned at a local level or a force-wide event? This is evident in the slow commencement of planning activity and the early change of Gold commander. The force has already recognised this issue and has taken the learning from it.

Regardless of this early confusion it is clear from the documentation supplied and the interviews undertaken that the role of Gold Commander was implemented from the outset. Commanders were identified who were operationally accredited and competent with the subsequent commander having an experienced public order background. It is clear that grip was exerted from this point onwards.

For the bulk of the operation Chief Superintendent Tony Blaker undertook the Gold role and it is clear from his strategy, the documentation provided prior to the Review and the interview conducted with him that he recognised his role and responsibilities as articulated in Authorised Professional Practice (APP).

There are a couple of areas where learning can be taken for future events.

The role of Gold commander is set out clearly in APP, obvious tensions exist where the Gold Commander is not an ACPO officer and other force commitments occur, this can play out in decision making at force level that can impact upon the achievement of the Gold Commander’s Strategic Objectives. This appears to have been subtly handled with the introduction of an Assistant Chief Constable into the process. This involvement was carefully articulated by Chief Superintendent Tony Blaker and seems to have worked. Care needs to be exercised in future operations to ensure that the Gold has the full authority to exercise their responsibilities in line with APP; this comment should also be taken in the context of command resilience per se.

It is recommended that there should be a clear single command Chain defined prior to any future operation that is resilient and consistent throughout; APP needs to be followed and complied with fully.

4.3 Span of command

It has already been noted that early intelligence indicating the potential magnitude of subsequent protest activity was missed and that Gold command moved from local to force wide control. It is unclear whether this early spread of responsibility at area command level
was so significant as to suggest that issues were being missed, however, it is clear that there were significant benefits in bringing a bespoke and dedicated command structure to the operation. It is clear from interview evidence that the protest activity became a full time role for those commanders involved to such an extent that they became exhausted and really needed organisational support. It is apparent that greater command resilience within key command functions would have been beneficial and greater involvement from other commanders either shadowing or other partial involvement at an earlier stage could have created greater resilience for the operation as a whole as the operation became increasingly protracted.

It is recommended that a bespoke dedicated command structure is identified for subsequent operations at the earliest available opportunity with command resilience plans designed from the commencement.

### 4.4 Clarity of reporting structures & roles

There is some evidence that the role of the PCC was not fully considered from the outset of the operation. Clearly the policing response was operational and the function of the PCC does not occupy this space but the PCC does have a responsibility to hold the force to account and is the public access point for community concerns about policing. A clearer agreement between the chief constable and the PCC on how their roles play out may assist with the future dynamics of protests of this type.

It is recommended that the force should work with the OPCC to define the interaction between the Force and the Police and Crime Commissioner recognising individual responsibilities in representing the communities of Sussex and roles and responsibilities under the policing Protocol.

Once formed the command structure appeared to work appropriately with responsibilities aligned with different vertical or functional areas of command. Available intelligence which could have helped the force respond to the earlier peaks in demand on the 25th July was not utilised in an effective a manner as possible. Police Liaison officers were deployed both prior to and after the 25th July, however, throughout the operation it is not clear where they reported in the chain of command. This is a common issue with usage of PLO teams as a relatively new tactic within UK policing. Consideration of the deployment of a dedicated PLO Bronze may help ensure that important intelligence is appropriately considered within the command structure and that an appropriate intelligence sterile corridor exists between those who are engaging directly with protestors and command. The College of policing may wish to review the APP regarding national guidance on this issue. (Supt. Simon Hawkins, will take up this issue with the College of Policing).

It is recommended that the deployment of a dedicated trained and accredited PLO bronze commander be considered for future operations.
4.5 Tactical Plan

The Silver Commander Superintendent Jane Derrick is a trained and accredited Silver Commander. Upon taking command she was surprised at the lack of pre-planning that had been put in place despite the fact that this issue had been on the forces’ radar since May 2013. It became very clear that a substantial operation was needed to respond to the emerging events and that the force had been caught ‘off guard’ with this issue. The arrangement of a Gold commander with additional ACPO support was at times both confusing and challenging for the silver commander.

During the first few weeks the commander was surprised at the lack of ‘force awareness’ in relation to this operation and found that there were silos of activity that all displayed a lack of grasp of the gravity of the situation. An example being routine officer safety training being conducted while mutual aid was being brought in to manage the operation. This created an impression within some officers that Op Mansell was not recognised as a strategic risk. Such practices appear to have had an impact upon the ability to mobilise a more swift and suitable response to the situation.

Following meetings with Cuadrilla in the run up to the weekend of August 17th-18th during which Cuadrilla suspended drilling activity, there was an increase in external scrutiny on the policing operation. Whilst public accountability is crucial this translated to higher levels of senior officer and PCC scrutiny on the tactical environment. This pressure appeared to have had an undue influence on Silver’s NDM considerations.

**It is recommended that any meetings between the command team and PCC should have the Gold Commanders agreement around areas of exploration.**

A proactive Freedom of Information (FOI) strategy appeared to work effectively, nipping potential FOI in the bud. The lack of dedicated resources across a number of disciplines (mutual aid, SIO, crime) was problematic whilst the provision of dedicated resources (PLO) was beneficial. PLOs played a pivotal role in the operation. The lack of appropriately signed MOU with Cuadrilla was problematic until remedied and effective lines of responsibility defined. There were legal issues with the same protestors returning time and again to the seat of protest despite previous arrests/interactions, and apparent lack of appropriate powers to manage these individuals. The lack of financial recognisance for Inspectors and above presents a resilience issue in the future (particularly protracted operations) in a lack of will to perform POPS roles.

There will always be the dynamic of the commercial requirements of the company and the right to protest for those wishing to do so. In the middle is the policing response. It is important that the Gold Commander is able to mitigate some of the demands as well as recognise the commercial nature of the operator. On some occasions this may require careful legal consideration. In the tactical environment it is also imperative that policing is
not the default solution to manage the demands of this type of operation; the Gold Commander should articulate the necessity for mitigating action and forward planning to reduce the policing demand in line with the “Role of the Police “as defined in the Operations APP.

It is recommended that the force should take a positive stance on the role of the company in security at site to reduce demand on policing from the outset

and

That the force should continue to take legal advice on the policing response and how best to manage the obvious tensions that will emerge between the business requirements of Cuadrilla and the right to protest.

4.6 Resource plan

The planning team invested considerable time and effort in acquiring sufficient resources rather than the actual deployment of those resources and the necessity of planning ahead. There does not appear to have been a dedicated resource Bronze commander aside from the resource manager for the force. This created an immediate double hatting effect between the operation and daily business and appears to have caused overload leading to reduced capability.

Resourcing issues were compounded by the fact that in some parts of the force evidence suggests there was an unofficial leave policy running with, in some cases up to 50% of resources allowed to take leave at any one time. This directly affected the force’s ability to meet its own mobilisation levels. There were officers shown on as working on force duty systems whose line managers had given them time off without any audit trail or recognition of the impact this could have outside their own departments.

The perception of the planning team was that there was a lack of understanding at Gold level of the need for Gold to take responsibility for resourcing. There was no directive from Gold to other departments to release staff for the operation which led to resourcing problems. It is apparent that leadership at a suitably senior level of the organisation is crucial in harnessing resources from across the organisation towards the discharge of a single aim and without it, departmental agendas can impact the outcome of an operation.

In the early stages of the operation there was insufficient consultation of the planning team which led to a lack of overall awareness of the resourcing arena at a Tactical and Strategic level. This created a knowledge gap for senior commanders and the regular request for the future scoping of resources. The exercise of scoping is widely recognised within the planning environment to be a fruitless exercise as resources scoped at time 1 are rarely still in the same place at time 2. Sussex police’s force level two Operational Planning Team, were not involved in the operation until the 25th July. Earlier involvement of the Operational Planning
team with commanders would have helped resolve some of these tensions, expedited issues and ultimately aided delivery at the operational end. There was also an issue with officers’ (particularly PSU commanders) refusing to recognise the authority of Police Staff planners when duty changes were made. This issue did not seem to be championed at a more senior level, with it being reported that by day 64 of the operation some 40% of the planning team reporting significant stress/exhaustion issues.

A decision was made to mobilise mutual aid, SERICC was approached on Mon 29th July. It would appear that there was some confusion around accommodation which was not initially offered for mutual aid resources, this limited the geographic spread from which resources could be drawn to those within a day’s travelling distance. This matter was reviewed for the key weekend of 17-18th August. Strategic and Tactical resources holding areas were set up, however the planning for their operation does not appear to have been sufficiently detailed.

If current experience is replicated in the roll out of Fracking then the Sussex resourcing experience will becoming invaluable in the national policing response. The Sussex team have already shared their experiences with other forces but the resource demands should similarly be part of the national policing response.

It is recommended that for future events a dedicated resource Bronze is identified from the beginning of the operation harnessing the skills which exist within the force to proactively manage resource issues and communicate these into the command chain.

It is recommended that the potential requirements for resourcing during the summer of 2014 should be considered by the force and also fed into NPoCC so that this can form part of the force, regional and national resource requirements during the year.

Force Operational Planning and Force resourcing leads should be included in initial Strategic Planning meetings to enable an holistic picture of force capability and capacity to feature in the strategic Planning process.

4.7 Crime Plan

The review team have specifically added this section into the report because this was clearly an area that received insufficient attention during the early stages of the operation. There does not appear to have been any consideration of the likely impact such an event would have on the force’s crime resources and insufficient consideration of an end to end crime process. The initial crime plan utilised only two divisional PCs and failed to recognise the size or impact of the crime operation.

Until the appointment of DS Townsend, two weeks after the operation had started there was no crime SIO/Bronze crime. His involvement has been of great value to operation and he was able to implement end to end crime processes from initial evidence capture, through
prisoner handling to representation at court. Until his involvement there was substantial oversight in all of these areas. The staffing arrangements within the team even after DS Townsend’s involvement were inconsistent until the last few weeks. This prevented any continuity or development of expertise.

During the operation standardised police bail policies were challenged in court and overturned. The first trial in relation to Obstruction of the Public Highway was discontinued upon judicial review. The obstruction itself was deemed “deminimis” and as such the public interest factors of the prosecution were brought under the spotlight. This in turn prompted a joint Police and CPS review of all outstanding trials to ensure that similar matters were not brought to trial. It appears that the absence of initial clear charging guidelines and standards may have unnecessarily added to the investigative process. A positive relationship with CPS was established through the allocation of a dedicated prosecutor; however, their involvement pre-event in guiding charging standards may have also prevented the complications experienced in court.

There is now a ‘toxic debt’ with post event investigations and court procedures, there are now some 13,000 plus disclosure items, some circa 1000 statements from 419 people. Currently there are still around fifty pending court cases for low level offences but often defence lawyers are demanding significant disclosure, creating disproportionate workloads. This level of post event demand cannot be underestimated and will take several more months to work its way throughout the court system requiring continued expertise and resource.

**It is recommended that an experienced crime SIO be identified from the outset of future operations and that they take responsibility for setting appropriate end to end procedures and resources levels.**

### 4.8 Briefing & De-briefing

During the early stages of the operation, briefings were conducted by the Silver and Bronze commanders personally with assistance of PowerPoint slides for general background and intelligence. Evidence suggests that these slides were not updated and as such officers on the ground were not furnished with the most accurate information and intelligence. The drain of repeated briefing on the Silver and Bronze commanders was apparent. Additional logistical support was provided as operations intensified towards the weekend of 17–18th August, however, officers selected to deliver briefings were not suitably knowledgeable to deliver effective briefings resulting in sub-optimal information flow to officers on the ground.
It is recommended that a dedicated and suitably skilled briefing team is utilised within the tactical holding area to ensure that accurate and timely briefing is provided to front line resources.

5.0 Recommendations:

It is clear that Operation Mansell placed additional demands and pressures upon the force which could have been significantly reduced with suitable forward planning. The force to its credit has already carried out a number of actions to mitigate a repetition of many of the issues the review team identified.

Fracking is likely to remain an area of great interest to communities affected by such operations, environmentalists, media and politicians. This means that any police activity has the potential to be closely scrutinised and expose any planning or command weaknesses.

The recommendations contained within are based upon the observations of the review team and are for consideration in conjunction with work already completed by Sussex in this area. While the review team were pleased to see the positive steps taken to address the issues it would strongly encourage some ‘reality’ checking to ensure that there are no gaps. Certainly the flow of information and intelligence would be an area that needs to be tested on a number of occasions to secure the confidence that all the necessary checks and balances are in place.

The summary of recommendations below should assist the force to focus its activity as it sees appropriate within the changes already undertaken. It may help the force to have a follow up review in June 2014 to provide an independent health check that provides reassurances around implementation of changes.

Furthermore the review team would be happy to plan and deliver a table top exercise to explore some of the issues identified within this review.

Summary:

1 - Given that there is a likelihood of increased use of Fracking and protest activity there is a need for the force to review its intelligence requirements, and flow, and how this feeds into, and is serviced by, the national Infrastructure.

2 - The use of protestor liaison should be maximised to allow for greater mitigation on police resources.

3 - Given the increased public interest in Fracking consideration should be given to if there are more effective communications to the public of Sussex, and the release of information under the FOI.
4 - There should be a clear single command Chain defined prior to any future operation that is resilient and consistent throughout; APP needs to be followed and complied with fully.

5 - The force should review the interplay between a local policing operation and what constitutes a force wide policing response so that there is no confusion about who owns what and when.

6 - Should review the investigative and prosecution strategy to ensure that it is proportionate and justified.

7 - Lessons learnt should be fed into the emerging national coordination on Fracking.

8 - It is recommended that a formal MOU between operating company and Police should be sought at the earliest possible stage of future operations.

9 - It is recommended that there should be a clear single command Chain defined prior to any future operation that is resilient and consistent throughout; APP needs to be followed and complied with fully.

10 - It is recommended that a bespoke dedicated command structure is identified for subsequent operations at the earliest available opportunity with command resilience plans designed from the commencement.

11 - It is recommended that the force should work with the OPCC to define the interaction between the Force and the Police and Crime Commissioner recognising individual responsibilities in representing the communities of Sussex and roles and responsibilities under the policing Protocol.

12 - It is recommended that the deployment of a dedicated PLO bronze commander be considered for future operations.

13 - It is recommended that any meetings between the command team and PCC should have the Gold Commanders agreement around areas of exploration.

14 - It is recommended that the force should take a positive stance on the role of the company in security at site to reduce demand on policing from the outset.

15 - That the force should continue to take legal advice on the policing response and how best to manage the obvious tensions that will emerge between the business requirements of Cuadrilla and the right to protest.
16 - It is recommended that for future events a dedicated resource Bronze is identified from the beginning of the operation harnessing the skills which exist within the force to proactively manage resource issues and communicate these into the command chain.

17 - It is recommended that the potential requirements for resourcing during the summer of 2014 should be considered by the force and also fed into NPoCC so that this can form part of the force, regional and national resource requirements during the year.

18 - It is recommended that an experienced crime SIO be identified from the outset of future operations and that they take responsibility for setting appropriate end to end procedures and resources levels.

19 - It is recommended that a dedicated and suitably skilled briefing team is utilised within the tactical holding area to ensure that accurate and timely briefing is provided to front line resources.

20 - Force Operational Planning and Force resourcing leads should be included in initial Strategic Planning meetings to enable an holistic picture of force capability and capacity to feature in the strategic Planning process.